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INTRODUCTION
Few historical documents have both received more attention and
spawned a greater division of opinion than Magna Carta. On one side
stands its popular reputation; on the other its reputation among most
scholars. The former is the enthusiastic opinion commonly expressed
by speakers at meetings and dinners held to celebrate King John’s
acceptance of the Great Charter at Runnymede in 1215. They praise
Magna Carta’s role in establishing the rule of law. The Charter is said
to have provided the foundation for later assertions of the supremacy
of that salutary principle in the common law of England. It also
influenced the constitutional system of the early American republic,
and, even today, its relevance to securing the protection of human
rights has not altogether disappeared. The latter, a negative opinion
that a majority of professional historians seem to share, regards
Magna Carta’s exalted reputation as a myth. In its origins, historians
say, the Charter did little or nothing to promote good government.
Nor, they add, did it serve to protect the legal rights of the great
majority of English men and women. It served only the baronial class.
Its glorification was a later invention, attributable to myth-making
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lawyers like Edward Coke in the seventeenth century and William
Blackstone in the eighteenth.1
This Article addresses primarily the second of these two
opposing opinions. It has an object in view—to narrow the gap
between the scholarly view and the popular opinion by examining the
jurisprudential assumptions that prevailed at the time the Charter
became part of English law. These assumptions were not identical to
those that dominate modern legal thought, and they need to be better
understood if we are to evaluate fairly Magna Carta’s place in the
history of our law. Such an evaluation will not prove that everything
commonly said in praise of the 1215 Charter is true. Some of it is
myth. But it is not all myth. Many of the negative characterizations of
the Charter’s character simply reflect a different way of thinking
about law than that which prevails today.
I. THE GREAT CHARTER AS MYTH
The argument that Magna Carta’s reputation as a guarantee of
civil liberties and human rights is misleading, even false, seems first to
have been articulated clearly more than one hundred years ago by
Edward Jenks.2 Reacting against the fulsome praise for the Charter
found in Bishop William Stubbs’s Constitutional History of England,3
the then-dominant opinion on the subject, Jenks fastened on the
restriction to free men in some of the Charter’s guarantees. He sought
to bring these restrictions to light in order to unmask “the false
glamour which invests Magna Carta.”4 In fact, he said, it is likely that
1. See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND *46 (stating that no man may be “dispossessed of his free-hold (that is) lands,
or livelihood, or of his liberties, or free customes . . . as belong to him by his free birthright, unlesse it be by the lawfull judgement, that is, verdict of his equals (that is, of men of
his own condition) or by the Law of the Land”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *424 (“[Magna Carta] protect[s] every individual of the nation in the free
enjoyment of his life, his liberty and his property . . . .”). For a current statement of the
Charter’s status as discussed in academic literature, including examples, see generally
NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 92–109 (2012)
(discussing the Charter’s role as “totem and as artefact”).
2. See Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 260, 260–61 (1904);
see also Bryce D. Lyon, The Lawyer and Magna Carta, 23 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 416, 416–
18 (1951).
3. See 1 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 579 (lib. ed. 1880) (describing the Charter as “the first great
public act of the nation after it ha[d] realised its own identity”). For a more recent and
favorable evaluation of Stubbs’s treatment of constitutional questions, see James
Campbell, The Anglo-Saxon Origins of English Constitutionalism, in LAW, GOVERNANCE,
AND JUSTICE: NEW VIEWS ON MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 15, 23–25 (2013).
4. Jenks, supra note 2, at 268.
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in 1215 only about one-sixth of the adult male population would have
qualified for even the limited protection offered in the Charter’s
clauses. Villeins, women, and some others were excluded.5 Most of
the other clauses would also have had little positive effect in practice,
even when their wording might seem to have applied. These clauses
were reactionary in character. Many were actually harmful. “As a
matter of fact,” Jenks concluded in discussing the institution of trial
by jury, the Charter “delayed indefinitely the adoption of that
wholesome reform.”6 The character of its clauses, attached as they
were to the ancient privileges and immemorial customs of the
baronage, infected the whole. They were the opposite of what was
needed to safeguard English liberties. In short, Magna Carta was a
document designed for the magnates, occasioned by their personal
conflicts with the King, aimed at entrenching baronial privileges, and
marred by an unwarranted reverence for outworn prejudices of the
past.
Most, though not quite all, of these negative characterizations
were confirmed by the fundamental work on the provisions of Magna
Carta by William McKechnie a few years after Jenks’s article
appeared.7 For example, McKechnie argued that the intent of the
barons was thoroughly backward-looking; they “professed to be
demanding nothing new.”8 The correct reading of “freemen” who
could claim protection under clause 34 was restricted to
“landowner[s] with a manorial court.”9 It did not protect ordinary
men and women.10 Constitutional principles like equality before the
law and the availability of writs of habeas corpus, both of which
“ha[d] been discovered in various clauses of the Great Charter,” were

5. “Villein” was the term commonly used by English lawyers to describe men and
women held in a form of servitude to a lord. However, they were treated as free as to
everyone else; they were not slaves. There was also a considerable variety in the services
they owed to their lords.
6. Jenks, supra note 2, at 270. Jenks repeated this argument in his later work,
EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO
THE END OF THE YEAR 1911, at 48 (Little, Brown & Co. 1913) (describing the supposed
connection between Magna Carta and jury trial as “so long and so profoundly
misunderstood”).
7. See WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 109–38 (2d ed. 1914).
8. Id. at 111.
9. Id. at 115.
10. See, e.g., Janet S. Loengard, What Did Magna Carta Mean to Widows?, in MAGNA
CARTA AND THE ENGLAND OF KING JOHN 134, 139–40 (J. Loengard ed., 2010) (noting
that even the limited protection extended to widows did not apply if either they or their
husbands were villeins).
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not actually there.11 McKechnie concluded that what Stubbs and
others had done in making a link between those principles and the
clauses of the Great Charter had “diffused false notions of the
development of English law.”12 It was commonly called “Great” only
because it was long.13
This negative depiction of the Charter’s place in English history
received an emphatic boost from the publication, in 1957, of an
influential book by J. G. A. Pocock: The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law.14 His conclusions echoed the equally influential work of
Christopher Hill: Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution.15 Both
used Sir Edward Coke, whose attitude towards the common law
Pocock described as being “as nearly insular as a human being’s could
be” in order to show that English lawyers regarded the law of their
own times as having existed unchanged from time immemorial.16 In
the seventeenth century, Coke is said to have believed, the common
law was as it had been in 1215. In fact, he seems to have thought that
the common law had not changed materially since before the
Conquest. Institutions like trial by jury and government by
Parliament had existed time out of mind; thus, they were unchanged
and unchangeable. This was the “myth of the ancient constitution” in
which Magna Carta played a prominent part.17 As portrayed by
Pocock, Coke’s argument was that Magna Carta merely codified what
had always been the common law, and that opinion was obviously
false.

11. MCKECHNIE, supra note 7, at 133.
12. Id.; see also GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION 243 (1912) (dealing with the famous clause 39 (c. 29 of the statutory
version) and concluding that it was “strictly feudal in character”).
13. Jenks, supra note 2, at 261.
14. J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 56
(1957). Professor Pocock reissued this book thirty years later, with an addition in which he
retreated slightly from his depiction of the insularity of the common law and also sought to
clarify, but not to change, his position on the immutable character of English law as
portrayed by Coke and others. See J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND
THE FEUDAL LAW: A REISSUE WITH A RETROSPECT 337–41 (1987) [hereinafter POCOCK,
REISSUE].
15. Compare POCOCK, supra note 14, at 56 (chastising Coke’s alleged belief that the
law was unchanging), with CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION: REVISITED 229 (1997) (characterizing Coke’s anachronistic
interpretations as having been made “so lovingly and so inaccurately”). For a summary of
the praise and the criticism for Pocock’s depiction of Coke, see DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR
EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE LAWS 10–13 (2014).
16. POCOCK, REISSUE, supra note 14, at 56.
17. Id. at 36.
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Of course, it is true that neither jury trial nor the House of
Parliament existed in 1215.18 Instead, they were the products of
historical development. It is also true, as critics pointed out,19 that the
Great Charter of 1215 did not afford any direct protection to the vast
majority of the English population. Clause 21, for example, stated
that “Earls and Barons are not to be amerced save by their
peers . . . .”20 Such a provision might protect ancestors of the Earl of
Grantham and his residence at Downton Abbey, but it did nothing
for the medieval antecedents of the middle class. It was the proper
task of the modern historian, therefore, to recognize and make public
the anachronistic assumptions about the Charter which had come to
be revered as a palladium of liberty and due process. Coke and
Blackstone shared responsibility with other members of their
profession for creating this illusion of the Charter’s wide purpose.21
Revealing what they had done required telling the truth about the
contents of Magna Carta.22 Sometimes it required more; it required
taking a thoroughly skeptical view of the enduring worth of the
Charter’s provisions in modern jurisprudence. Viewed for what it was
in 1215, the Charter was irrelevant in the modern world, critics said.
This conclusion is the source of its separation from the popular view.
18. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 205–07, 507–
08 (4th ed. 2002).
19. See, e.g., Jenks, supra note 2, at 267–69 (noting that many of the privileges
recognized in Magna Carta pertained only to the aristocratic landowning class).
20. MAGNA CARTA ch. 21 (1215), reprinted and translated in DAVID CARPENTER,
MAGNA CARTA 46–47 (2015).
21. See, e.g., CHARLES OGILVIE, THE KING’S GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMON
LAW: 1471–1641, at 1446 (1958).
22. See, e.g., CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 28
(British Lib. 2010) (stating that the Charter was “not a statement of fundamental
principles of liberty, but a series of concessions addressing long-standing baronial
grievances”); CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 435–43 (discussing the many failures in
Magna Carta’s enforcement); Jane Frecknall-Hughes, Re-examining King John and
Magna Carta, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES 244,
246 (Anthony Musson & Chantal Stebbings eds., 2012) (arguing that the Charter was
“primarily a tax rebellion”); Craig S. Lerner, Magna Carta and Modern Myth-Making:
Proportionality in the ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishments’ Clause, in MAGNA CARTA AND
ITS MODERN LEGACY 147, 148 (Robert Hazell & James Melton eds., 2015) (arguing that,
despite popular myth, the Charter did not support a proportionality of punishment
principle as was later adopted by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution);
ROBERT M. PALLITTO, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREAT CHARTER: COMMON LAW
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MAGNA CARTA 16–18 (2015) (describing the “Myth of
Magna Carta,” which argues that what the document meant to its signatories was quite
different from “what is commonly supposed”); Michael Dillon, Magna Carta and the
United States Constitution: An Exercise in Building Fences, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW 81, 98–105 (D. Magraw et al. eds., 2014) (devoting a section to “Creating
the Myth of Magna Carta”).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2016)

1480

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

It is this skeptical position that this Article challenges.23 Making
good on this challenge requires examining the text of Magna Carta as
it was understood and interpreted in earlier centuries. That
examination must start with a look at the principles of interpretation
of statutes and other legal texts that were prevalent in both the
century in which the Charter was written and in which Coke and
other common lawyers interpreted its clauses.
II. MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE
LAW
Magna Carta was taken to be a statute almost from its inception.
It was an extraordinary statute, since it was “declaratory of the
principall grounds of fundamentall Laws of England,” but it was still a
statute.24 It could be (and was) amended. Of course, it had not been
“enacted” by King and Parliament in 1215. This procedure did not
exist at that time. However, it was very soon given the authority of a
statute and treated as such by commentators.25 The Great Charter
was not unique in this respect; several other early enactments that
were treated as statutes shared an equal uncertainty about the
authority by which they had been issued.26 Moreover, the Charter was
expressly referred to as a statute in official documents from at least as
early as the reign of Edward I.27 It maintained its place as a statute
thereafter. The English “canon of statutes began with the
confirmation of Magna Carta in 1225.”28 It was taken to be the first
and oldest of the statutes. That was a position it did not relinquish—
from the production of manuscript copies of the “Old Statutes”
during the Middle Ages to the publication of the double folio

23. For more moderate views, recognizing the ambiguities in the evidence, see
ANDREW BLICK, BEYOND MAGNA CARTA: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM 37–44 (2015); J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 314–44 (3d ed. 2015); JOHN
HUDSON, 2 OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 871–1216, at 847–63 (2012).
24. COKE, supra note 1, at *A Proeme.
25. See Margaret McGlynn, From Charter to Common Law: The Rights and Liberties
of the Pre-Reformation Church, in MAGNA CARTA, RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
53–69 (Robin Griffith-Jones & Mark Hill eds., 2015). See generally 132 SELECTED
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES ON MAGNA CARTA 1400–1604 (John Baker ed., 2015)
(covering readings on English statutes at the Inns of Court that so treated the Great
Charter).
26. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 204–12.
27. See Assize of Novel Disseisin (Hereford 1291), reprinted in PLACITORUM IN
DOMO CAPITULARI WESTMONASTERIENSI ASSERVATORUM ABBREVIATIO 286 (1811)
(referring to Magna Carta as “statutum de Ronemede”).
28. BAKER, supra note 18, at 205.
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volumes of the Statutes of the Realm between 1810 and 1822.29 When
Sir Edward Coke placed Magna Carta first in the Second Part of
Institutes, which he devoted to the exposition of English statutes, he
was doing no more than following a habit normal among English
lawyers. Any assessment of its interpretation (and its worth) must
therefore take account of the Charter’s statutory character.
So what? Does this classification matter? This Article argues that
it does. Among other things, it matters because it requires us to seek a
greater understanding of how statutory texts were interpreted in the
centuries when Magna Carta was formulated and when Coke
described its consequences in law. As Charles Donahue has said, “If
we do not think about it, we are likely to assume that the men and
women of the later Middle Ages shared our ideas.”30 Sometimes they
shared our opinions, but sometimes they did not. On this subject in
particular, time and distance separate the attitude of lawyers in earlier
centuries from our own. I begin with the textbook examples, taken
from the storehouses of the European ius commune.
A. Continental Examples
The normal starting point for describing and justifying the civil
law’s method of statutory interpretation was a text from the Roman
law. A provision in the first book of the Codex contains an imperial
decree declaring that: “To follow the words of the law and not its
mind is to offend against the law.”31 The decree proceeds to
“command that all interpretation of the laws, both old and new, shall
be carried out accordingly.”32 Other provisions in the texts illustrate
how this might be done. In medieval practice, the principle that
statutes should be interpreted according to established principles of
law wherever feasible often dispensed with literal reading of legal
texts, particularly when the literal reading led to results perceived to
be unjust. This imperial decree was not simply a statement that no
one should be punished in the absence of a clear law prohibiting what
29. See DAINES BARRINGTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANCIENT STATUTES
FROM THE MAGNA CHARTA TO THE TWENTY-FIRST OF JAMES I CAP. XXVII, at 1–3 (4th
ed. 1775) (referring to the Charter as the “most ancient of our statutes, which may at
present be enforced”).
30. Charles Donahue, Jr., Conclusion: Comparative Approaches to Marriage in the
Later Middle Ages, in REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN MATRIMONIAL LAW AND CUSTOM IN
EUROPE, 1150–1600, at 289, 291 (Mia Korpiola ed., 2011).
31. CODE JUST. 1.14.5 (Constantine 439) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2008),
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/books/book1/book%201-14rev
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CGZ-YP6W].
32. This is the summary from the glossa ordinaria ad id.
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he had done. In fact, it could function as the reverse; it could extend
to punishing actions that were contrary to the intention of a decree
even though they were not covered by the words themselves.33
A simple example, one that would have been well known to
every European law student who attended to his studies, was this34: A
statute enacted for the city of Bologna punished any person who shed
blood in the municipal palace. It so happened that a barber shaving a
client within the palace cut him by accident, shedding his blood and
thus falling afoul of the statute’s prohibition. Was he in violation of
the statute? Did respect for a statute law require that hard result? No,
the student would have learned. It did not. The purpose of the
statute—its “mind”—was to punish those who purposefully shed
blood in a location where peace should reign. It had not been meant
to punish inattentive barbers. The statute’s drafters would themselves
have provided for an exception had the barber’s case been called to
their attention. One lesson this case imparted to the student,
therefore, was that statutes were not always to be read literally. They
were to be interpreted according to their purposes. How did one
identify the purpose? That was pretty obvious in this case: to prevent
intentional attacks in which blood was shed. The Bolognese example
is analogous to the case of a sign reading “No Vehicles in the Park” in
modern academic jurisprudence. Such a sign prohibits driving a
vehicle into the park. It does not prohibit a statute which includes the
depiction of a vehicle. Its words might cover erection of such a
statute, but its intent would not.
If the Bolognese barber’s case was the most familiar example of
statutory construction in the Middle Ages, it now seems a slightly
unfortunate one. Its result is too obvious. The greatest of medieval
legists, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, said that the opposite result “would
be absurd” and he was clearly right35 Moreover, this widely known
example is actually an understatement of how far jurists were
sometimes willing to stray from a strict interpretation of statutes. A
better example that went a little further—also a common one in the
early training of lawyers—was the question of whether a city’s statute
criminalizing grain exportation in times of scarcity also forbade the
33. See DIG. 1.3.29 (Charles Henry Monro trans., 1904). See generally IAN MACLEAN,
INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE RENAISSANCE 142–52 (1992) (discussing the
interpretations of the text of ancient Roman statutes).
34. See, e.g., Guido Calabrese, Two Functions of Formalism: In Memory of Guido
Tedeschi, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 481 (2000) (describing a slightly different version of the
same example).
35. See BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO, COMMENTARIA, COD. 1.14(17).5, no. 12
(Venice, 1570–1571).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2016)

2016]

THE MYTH OF MAGNA CARTA

1483

export of flour.36 Under the proper reading of the statutory
prohibition, the jurists concluded, flour was covered as well as wheat.
The statute’s coverage extended even to the export of bread, because
bread was made in part from grain.37 The logic here seemed
convincing from the point of view of the statute’s larger intent. Its
extension achieved the opposite of the result that would have been
reached had the rule of lenity applied. Yet, flour was merely grain in a
different form, and the preservation of grain generally for the benefit
of the people in the affected area was the statute’s object. Hence it
should be extended beyond its words to cover what had been within
the “mind” of the statute. The example would also have shown that
invocation of a statute’s larger intent could expand its coverage as
well as restrain it, as it had done in the Bolognese barber’s case.
Another instructive example, one that modern scholars have
investigated with care, moved far beyond the relatively timid steps
towards expansive methods of statutory interpretation endorsed by
the first two. Occupying the opposite end of the spectrum of juristic
freedom in textual interpretation, this example illustrates the
possibilities inherent in the methods just described. It comes from the
use that medieval lawyers commonly made of the text: Quod omnes
tangit ab omnibus approbari debet. The words meant simply that what
touches all should be approved by all, and they came from a law of
the Emperor Justinian.38 The same text was also included in the
Regulae iuris of the medieval canon law,39 and it was commonly used
in the Middle Ages to require the consent of those affected by
taxation before they could be required to pay.40 The provision also
served to justify granting the power of consent to representatives of
the people required to pay the taxes. It thus served to advance the
36. See GUIDO PAPA, IN AUGUSTISSIMO SENATU GRATIANOPOLITANO
DECISIONES, Dec. 373 (Geneva, 1667) (“Et quia ubi mens legis, idem plus habet quam
verba, attendi debet ad mentem, sicut ad verba.”); see also JOANNES BAPTISTA
HODIERNA, ELABORATAE ADDITIONES ET ANNOTATIONES AD DECISIONES
MANTUANI SENATUS JO. PETRI SURDI, DECISIONES MANTUANAE UNIVERSAE, Dec.
139, no. 2. (Naples, 1643).
37. See, e.g., BARTOLUS, supra note 35, at COD. 1.14(17).5, no. 10.
38. CODE JUST. 5.59.5.2 (Justinian 531) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2008)
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/book-5pdf/book%205-59.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VPC4-K83N]. A few other texts in Roman law contained the same idea,
but always in the context of private law. See Constantin Fasolt, Quod omnes tangit ab
omnibus approbari debet: The Words and the Meaning, in IN IURE VERITAS: STUDIES IN
CANON LAW IN MEMORY OF SHAFER WILLIAMS 21, 25–26 (1991).
39. VI 5.12.29.
40. See Orazio Condorelli, Quod omnes tangit debet ab omnibus approbari: Notes on
the Origin and Use of the Principle from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Era, 53 IUS
CANONICUM 101, 114 (2013).
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growth of parliaments and other European representative
institutions. In England, the words from Justinian’s Codex found an
echo in Bracton41 and were used expressly in writs of summons to the
“Model Parliament” of 1295.42
As found in the Codex itself, however, the text said nothing of
the sort. The words of the text simply stated that when several
persons had been appointed as tutores (guardians) for a minor or
other person under a disability, all of them had to be summoned to
appear before termination of the joint grant of tutorship could
occur.43 Were any fair-minded person to take a narrow look at the
subject, the extension of this text to justify the growth and power of
parliaments would seem an artificial stretch—too far-fetched to
attract the attention of a serious student of the subject. However, the
extension to cover taxation did in fact occur,44 and it happened
because medieval lawyers saw in this text an underlying principle that
was connected with due process of law. The “mind” of the text was
applicable in public law, just as it was in the administration of private
law. As guardians of infants have power to arrange the affairs of those
infants they represented, so too could members of assemblies bind the
people they had been appointed to represent. Although the public
could be represented by delegates they had chosen, full consent of
those affected by taxation was necessary. If this principle were to be
applied in the case of guardianship, jurists thought, its rationale might
legitimately be extended to cover a situation that had not occurred in
ancient Rome. Its principle might apply more widely.
This interpretation’s importance for the more general history of
medieval law is that Continental jurists sometimes found a general
concept or principle stated and applied within Roman and canon law
texts.45 They so used those texts, expanding them and determining
41. 2 BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 21 (Samuel E. Thorne
trans., George E. Woodbine ed., 1968).
42. 1 THE PARLIAMENTARY WRITS AND WRITS OF MILITARY SUMMONS 30 (Francis
Palgrave ed., 1827).
43. CODE JUST. 5.59.5 (Justinian 531) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2008) http://www
.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/book-5pdf/book%205-59.pdf [http://perma.cc
/VPC4-K83N].
44. Gaines Post, A Romano-canonical Maxim, ‘Quod omnes tangit,’ in Bracton, 4
TRADITIO 197, 236 (1946).
45. For fuller treatment see Bruce Brasington, “A Divine Precept of Fraternal Union”:
The Maxim Quod omnes tangit in Anglo-American Thought to the Ratification of the
Constitution, in BRIDGING THE MEDIEVAL-MODERN DIVIDE 205–06 (2013); Yves
Congar, Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet, 36 REVUE
HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ÉTRANGER 210–59 (4th ed. 1958); Post, supra note
44.
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what they could mean in practice. The juristic technique known as
aequiparatio—finding equality between terms that at first seemed
distant from each other—proved particularly fruitful in this context.46
It meant that where the reason behind a statute was clear, its remedy
might be extended to a case not covered by its words.47 Some of the
equivalences that early jurists discovered in the texts fit modern ideas
about the subject. Some did not. More important than this speculative
tie to the assumptions of modern law was the principle that the
“mind” of the law was what mattered, and that this “mind” was
presumed to stand in accord with recognized principles of justice.48
Among other things, it provided an opening for application of
principles drawn from the law of nature. Wherever possible, the
words of a statute should therefore be brought to an understanding
that was “sane, good, civil, and alien to evil.”49 Doing so facilitated
occasional imaginative leaps, of which the use of Quod omnes tangit is
but one example.50
One should not, however, regard this particular example as a
frequent event in earlier centuries. Jurists within the traditions of the
ius commune were cautious men. They would not expand coverage of
a statute if the statute’s “mind” was itself doubtful.51 They did not
respond directly to the changing mores of the time, and they rarely
made arguments without support from the authoritative texts and the
opinions of their fellow jurists. Perhaps their expansive use of Quod
omnes tangit was encouraged by the commonly accepted principle
that rulers should act with good counsel, not least in matters touching

46. The common example was the interpretive efforts of medieval law professors to
extend the privileges granted to soldiers in Roman law to themselves. The argument was
that the Doctores were thought to be of equal “dignity.” See, e.g., BARTOLUS, supra note
35, at COD. 12.1.1.
47. See, e.g., STEPHANUS GRATIANUS, DISCEPTATIONUM FORENSIUM IUDICIORUM,
Tom I, cap. 82, no. 20 (Venice, 1649) (“Statuta enim extenduntur ex identitate
rationis . . . praesertim cum statutum loquatur per dictiones multum generales.”)
48. E.g., D. CAESARE BARZIO, DECISIONES ALMAE ROTAE BONONIENSIS, Dec. 97,
nos. 35–36 (Venice, 1610) (“[R]atio sit sicut anima et spiritus legis, verba autem sint sicut
corpus et superficies, ratio legis est quae ipsam legem regulat.”); see also 2 ENNIO
CORTESE, LA NORMA GIURIDICA: SPUNTI TEORICI NEL DIRITTO COMUNE CLASSICO
317–20 (1964).
49. G. B. COCCINI, DECISIONES SACRAE ROMANAE ROTAE, Dec. 70 (Lyon, 1623)
(“Verborum enim significatio debet ad intellectum sanum bonum civilem et vitio
carentem applicari.”).
50. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 43–46 (2013).
51. BARTOLUS, supra note 35, at COD. 1.14(17).5, no. 5. (“[S]ed si mens esset dubia
non posset recedi a verbis[.]”).
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the interests of their subjects.52 However, the jurists themselves did
not say so.53 Except as one part of establishing a lawful custom, public
opinion rarely counted as a formal source of guidance for the jurists.
The example shows what was possible under principles the jurists
accepted. It was not, however, an everyday occurrence in European
courts.
B.

English Examples

Many commonalities existed between the early development of
European and English common law; for example, the method of
interpreting statutes found in the ius commune was also used in
England from the common law’s early days. Sir Edward Coke himself
began his commentary on Magna Carta by stating that the Charter’s
“mind” was surely great even though it was contained within a small
body.54 Common lawyers had their own textbook examples
paralleling the case involving the Bolognese prohibition against
shedding blood,55 and they recognized examples of interpretation that
departed even further from a literal interpretation. Some early
English judges could even add words to statutes they believed had
been omitted by oversight, thus providing a remedy in a case where a
literal reading of a statute would have left aggrieved parties without
relief.56 What was called the “equity of a statute” sometimes allowed
courts of the common law to extend statutory protection in similar
circumstances even where the words of the statute taken literally
would not cover them.57

52. For relevant textual authorities and discussion, see R. H. Helmholz, Magna Carta
and the ius commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 322–24 (1999).
53. See, e.g., Emanuele Conte, “Defensa”: Resistance Against Unjust Power in the
Medieval Learned Law (12th–13th Centuries), in REVOLTEN UND POLITISCHE
VERBRECHEN ZWISCHEN DEM 12. UND 19. JAHRHUNDERT 121, 123 (2013) (noting the
“isolation” of legal science from the political and social “realities” during the late
medieval period).
54. COKE, supra note 1, at *A Proeme (“Mens tamen in parvo corpore magna fuit,”
comparing it to Alexander the Great, whose prowess was great even though his body was
small).
55. See, e.g., Reniger v. Fogossa (1550) 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 29; 1 Plowden 1, 18 (laws
against beating not applicable to beating a person of unsound mind in order to prevent a
greater harm likely to be initiated by the person beaten).
56. See J. H. BAKER & S. F. C. MILSON, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY:
PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 52–53 (1986) (detailing the 1312 English case Belyng v. Anon).
57. For examples, see NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 104–07 (1990). For later examples, see generally Rex v.
Slaughter (1699) 90 Eng. Rep. 936; Holt K.B. 69; Acton v. Pitcher (1599) 74 Eng. Rep. 723;
4 Leo. 51; Smith v. Vanger Colgay (1595) 78 Eng. Rep. 630; Cro. Eliz. 384; Milward v.
Clerk (1590) 78 Eng. Rep. 446; Cro. Eliz. 190.
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This approach survived the Middle Ages. Edmond Plowden (d.
1585) expressed it with clarity in a Tudor case:
It is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that
makes the law, and our law (like all others) consists of two
parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of
the law, but the sense and reason of the law is [its] soul.58
Lord Mansfield later gave voice to this same sentiment in only a
slightly different fashion: “A Statute very seldom can take in all
cases,” he wrote, “therefore the common law, that works itself pure
by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior
to an act of Parliament.”59
As on the Continent, English judges did not employ this
principle as an “open sesame” to rewrite the texts of Parliamentary
statutes.60 In fact, often they applied the words in a literal fashion,
even over substantial objections, and when they did go farther afield,
the umbrella under which they normally acted was what Sir John
Baker has called “the presumption of righteous intentions.”61 They
presumed that ambiguous or incomplete phrasing in a statute had
been meant by the law makers to achieve a just result. This reading of
Parliament’s intent was normally enough to prevent miscarriages of
justice that would have been compelled by a literal interpretation of
statutes.
Cases described in T. F. T. Plucknett’s exploration of the
treatment of statutes during the fourteenth century provide several
examples of the power this principle of statutory interpretation held.62
The statute De donis, for example, prohibited alienation of lands
conveyed in fee tail by the initial donee in tail, but it did not prohibit
alienation by the issue of the initial donee.63 In other words, the
restriction on alienation of lands held by fee tail would bind takers in
tail for only one generation. Objection to this literal interpretation of
De donis was raised in a case early in the reign of Edward II. In
58. Eyston v. Studd (1574) 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 694–95; 2 Plowden 459, 464–65; see also
Rex v. Prin. (1663) 83 Eng. Rep. 1131–32; 1 Keble 594–95.
59. Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23; 1 Atk. 21, 33.
60. E.g., Rex v. Inhabitants of Haughton (1718) 93 Eng. Rep. 399, 400; 1 Str. 83, 85.
61. Sir John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Renaissance England, 2
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 3, 20 (2004).
62. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE
FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 51–52 (1922); see also 2 STEFAN
VOGENAUER, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN IN ENGLAND UND AUF DEM
KONTINENT 673–81 (2001).
63. The Statute of Westminster the Second (De Donis Conditionalibus) 1285, 13 Edw.
1, st. 2, c. 1.
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consequence, the judge held the prohibition endured because “the
statute meant to bind the issue in fee tail as well as the feoffees until
the tail had reached the fourth degree; and it was only through
negligence that [the drafter] omitted to insert express words to that
effect.”64 The judge was thus able to give effect to what he believed
the true intent of the statute had been—a method which Plucknett
described as a “drastic piece of underpinning,” also taking note that
the result was “suspected [to be] of Roman origin.”65 This method
was also found among the Novels of the Emperor Justinian in the
Corpus iuris civilis.66
In any event, the results of applying this principle of statutory
interpretation lasted beyond the Middle Ages. Exclusion from the
law’s reach of conduct made unlawful or ineffective under literal
readings of the Statute of Frauds67 or the Statute of Limitations68 later
provided examples of equivalent exercises of judicial discretion. They
looked beyond the words used by the legislature. The Statute of
Frauds declares many acts and agreements unenforceable unless they
are reduced to written form. However, English judges have not
hesitated to enforce oral agreements when failure to do so would
itself amount to permitting a fraud. Allowing one person to take
unfair advantage of a neighbor was not what Parliament had meant to
permit. The “spirit” of the Statute has always been to prevent fraud.
Its literal interpretation, however, sometimes could actually
encourage fraud, and common law judges acted to prevent this. They
acted in accordance with what one commentator described as “their
supreme duty as courts of equity and conscience.”69
Assuming this position also allowed English judges to avoid
some of the consequences of their notoriously harsh criminal laws.
The extension of “benefit of clergy” to cover laymen as well as men in
holy orders is probably the most familiar example.70 As was true on
64. YB 5 Edw. 2, Pasch, pl. 2 (1312), reprinted in 31 SELDEN SOCIETY YEAR BOOK
SERIES 176–77 (1915).
65. PLUCKNETT, supra note 62, at 52.
66. NOV. 159.pr (555) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2009), http://www.uwyo.edu
/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/novels/141-168/novel%20159_replacement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LT3-TB57].
67. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes 1677, 29 Car. II, c. 3.
68. An Act for Lymytacion of Accions, and for Avoyding of Suite in Lawe 1624, 21
Jac. I, c. 16.
69. CAUSTEN BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS § 437 (5th ed. 1895).
70. See R.N. SWANSON, CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 149–
53 (1989). The relevant statute was An Ordinance for the Clergy 1352, 25 Edw. 3, st. 6, c.
3.
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the Continent, however, invoking of the “mind” of the statute was not
a code word for a “get out of jail free” card. The approach did not
routinely excuse criminal defendants from compliance with the
penalties provided for in the statutes.71 In fact, it could work the
opposite way by convicting men whose conduct appeared to be
outside the express language of a statute.
This side of statutory interpretation is well illustrated in a case
from Coke’s Reports.72 The residents of a hundred in Essex were
fined for their failure to pursue a fleeing robber.73 They denied any
liability, however, citing the common law rule that liability to the
Crown attached only for robberies committed during daylight
hours—the reasoning being that during the night most men were
properly “at rest” and could not practically be expected to pursue
fleeing felons.74 The robber in this case had in fact acted and escaped
under cover of night. Coke’s account of the case, however, invoked
the Statute of Winchester (1285)75 in rejecting this plea by the
hundred’s residents.76 That statute began by reciting the dangers of an
increasing number of robberies, murders, burnings and thefts.77 It
went on to require that “great Towns, being walled” keep their gates
closed at night and imposed liability on the towns if a felon made his
escape because of a lapse in that requirement.78 The words of the
statute obviously did not contemplate a rural hundred, but the
residents of this hamlet were fined nonetheless. Coke justified this
result, however, saying that the common law’s extension to cover
nighttime escapes regardless of the size of the town was proper. He
added that “[t]he Act hath changed the reason of the law, and
therefore the law itself is changed; for ratio legis est anima.”79 Coke’s
sentiments on statutory interpretation thus mirrored those of his
European counterparts. He recognized that statutes could have a
mind apart from their words.

71. Cf. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 475 (5th ed. 1951) (noting
how judges carry out both the will of the legislature and their own judicial logic in
determining liability).
72. Milborn’s Case (1577) 77 Eng. Rep. 420; 7 Co. Rep. 6b.
73. A hundred was an ancient subdivision of a county or shire.
74. Milborn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 421; 7 Co. Rep. at 6b.
75. The Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 1–6.
76. Milborn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 421; 7 Co. Rep. at 7a.
77. 13 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 1.
78. Id. c. 4.
79. Milborn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 421; 7 Co. Rep. at 7a.
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III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LATER COMMENTARY ON
MAGNA CARTA
The reason for examining the clauses of Magna Carta in light of
the contemporary methods of statutory interpretation is to show that
some of what now seem like anachronistic readings that were made of
its provisions in later centuries actually fit within contemporary ideas
about how statutes should be interpreted. Commentators could look
beyond the words of the Charter to its “mind.” Once discovered, that
“mind” gave judges considerable latitude in decisions. An
appropriate way of developing this theme is to return to the pivotal
figure of Sir Edward Coke. He has often been cast as one of those
most clearly responsible for the creation of the myth of Magna Carta.
His Institutes were influential, and they dealt with the Charter at
length.80
What does such an examination show? It shows three things—
the first of which is that this text contains less “myth making” than
some of Coke’s modern critics have suggested. In interpreting
“judgment by peers” in clause 39 (c. 29 in the later statutory version),
for example, he did not equate the term “judgment of peers” with a
common law jury. Rather, he recognized the limitation in its
applicability to only the nobility. Coke took some pains to describe
what was implied by the words “lawful judgment” (per legale
judicium), but he made clear that this particular clause dealt with the
nobility alone.81 He therefore distinguished the import of this clause
from ordinary procedures in the common law. Where a jury gave a
verdict, he noted, the noble peers simply returned “their verdict upon
their honour and ligeance to the King[.]”82 The clause’s reference was
not to a common law jury. Similarly, although Coke mentioned the
existence of Parliament several times in his coverage of the Charter,
he did so in the context of Parliament’s then current role in English
government.83 That was his primary task—explaining the applicable
law found in the Charter. He did not claim to be presenting a
historical account of its enactment. Even so, in its treatment in Coke’s

80. The second part of the Institutes was published only in 1642; its description of
Magna Carta is given an expansive reading in CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION
AND THE THRONE 515–18 (1956). A more measured interpretation is found in ANTHONY
ARLIDGE & IGOR JUDGE, MAGNA CARTA UNCOVERED 121–28 (2014).
81. COKE, supra note 1, at *48–49.
82. Id.
83. E.g., id. *35 (describing dukes, marquesses, and viscounts as “lords of parliament”
and stating that “there were no Dukes, Marquesses, or viscounts within England at the
making of the Statute”).
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Institutes, no actual assertion of the Charter’s enactment by
Parliament can be found.
The second “surprise” that emerges from reading Coke’s
discussion is how often he acknowledged the possibility, indeed the
reality, of change in English law. He did say that the Charter was
“declaratory of the ancient Law and Liberty of England,”84 but he
also noted places where time had brought amendments to existing law
and practice.85 He even recognized the possibility of change in the law
by desuetude.86 In interpreting Magna Carta, Coke was far from the
prisoner of the anachronistic belief that English law had remained the
same from the Laws of Aethelred onwards. He liked to express the
nature of the change that had occurred by using aphorisms. “[O]ut of
the old fields must come the new corne” was one favorite.87 The
image of creating new procedures “as out of a root” was another.88
These were two ways he used to describe changes that had occurred
in English law, changes that Coke apparently admired. Coke’s two
images also had the merit of accuracy. They described ways in which a
legal system does change, and Coke’s account of Magna Carta
recognized some of the possibilities they had made possible.
Third, Coke’s treatment of Magna Carta utilized the commonly
accepted method of statutory interpretation described in the body of
this Article. It was a cautious use, and only an occasional one. But it is
there. That is, Coke (and later Blackstone) understood that the words
of a statute like Magna Carta could contain a principle capable of
producing results greater than those that were readily apparent from
its text. His treatment of guarantees of rights to “free men” provides a
good example. According to Coke, this clause extended to women
and even to villeins.89 Why? It did so because in practice, the word
“men” was commonly understood in law to refer to women as well as
to men. And as for villeins, English law, as it had been developed,
included them in the category of free men. This happened because

84. Id. *3.
85. E.g., id. *18–19 (describing “[n]on seisiemus terram aliquam[,]” limiting the King’s
existing power to levy execution to collect debts owed to him); id. *42, (describing “[b]revi
inquisitionis,” as the enlargement of the possibility of relief from imprisonment by bail).
This point is well made in Anthony Musson, Myth, Mistake, Invention? Excavating the
Foundations of the English Legal Tradition, in 6 LAW AND HISTORY: CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES 63 (2003) (Andrew Lewis & Michael Lobban eds., 2004).
86. COKE, supra note 1, at *31 (describing “[c]onstabularius,” which is the
disappearance of “infangenthief and outfangenthief”).
87. Id. *22.
88. Id. *46.
89. Id.
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villeins were regarded as free against everyone but their lords. In
other words, they could be regarded as “free men” in most parts of
the law, with only one exception. The way was thereby opened to
their inclusion among those protected by the Great Charter’s text,90
and, as it turned out, this actually happened.91
At another place in this commentary, in dealing with the clause
that forbade the erection of fish weirs in the Thames and Medway
rivers,92 Coke similarly interpreted the prohibition to cover more than
obstacles to navigation. According to Coke, it included all
purprestures.93 Purpresture was then a general term, meaning an
encroachment on the public’s right to land, such as by erecting an
obstruction on a highway to prevent its use by others. In other words,
Coke understood the term “fish weirs” to embrace encroachments on
land as well as on navigable waters. The principle underlying the
prohibition of the obstructions to navigation generally thus extended
further than the words themselves. It was meant to protect freedom
of movement. Like most English lawyers, Coke did not use the phrase
“mind of the statute” to describe what he looked for in interpreting
this clause in the Great Charter. The term “equity” or “spirit” of a
statute was the more normal term in England.94 But it came to the
same thing.
CONCLUSION
In their commentaries on Magna Carta, Coke and Blackstone
were performing a common legal task—interpreting an authoritative
precedent to address a current issue. In doing so, they were
encouraged to give expansive readings to Magna Carta by applying a
commonly accepted method of statutory interpretation of their time.
This method looked beyond specific words used in the statute. It
looked to the goals and purposes of the enactment, which were in
accord with principles of right and justice. These goals were thought

90. For background on this topic, see SELECTED READINGS AND COMMENTARIES
note 25, at lxix–lxxiv.
91. Paul Vinogradoff, Clause 39, in MAGNA CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 78–
95 (Henry E. Malden ed., 1917); see also CHARLES M. GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY AND
THE COMMON LAW (1963).
92. MAGNA CARTA ch. 33 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
20, at 50–51.
93. See COKE, supra note 1, at *38.
94. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61; see also John V. Orth,
Blackstone’s Rules on the Construction of Statutes, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS
COMMENTARIES: BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 79, 79–80 (2009) (describing William
Blackstone’s ten “rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes”).
ON MAGNA CARTA, supra
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to lie within the specific words found in the texts of the statutes, and
they mattered as much or more than the words themselves. It was this
method of statutory interpretation that allowed judges and jurists in
earlier centuries to extend the reach of statutes to matters beyond the
limited view of the men who drafted them. Now, this may look like
“myth-making.” Then, it did not.
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